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ABSTRACT

THE DEVELOPMENT OF PROPERTY RIGHTS IN LAND:

A COMPARATIVE STUDY *

In order to examine the trends in the developme nt of property
rights in land in nineteent h and twentieth century Asia, a simple supply
and demand model of induced institutio nal change is presented . over much
of the period favorable terms of trade for land-inte nsive agricultu ral
products caused real land rents to appreciat e.

This induced an increase

in the demand for more secure and precise property rights in land. The
particula r type of institutio nal arrangeme nts supplied depended upon the
existing set of institutio ns and property rights, the stock of knowledge ,
and the political , economic and ideologic al interests of the governmen ts
in power.

The model is applied to four Asian countries , Thailand, Burma,

India, the Philippin es, and the experienc es are compared.

In all four

cases cadastral survey-ba sed land titling systems were introduced .
Finally, implicatio ns for future research are discussed .

•This paper

sketches sooie arguments about the development of property
rights systems in Asia and presents sane suggestive evidence.
Can
■ entary on both the analytical approach and incomplete empirical content
are more than welcome.
Previous versions of ·the J>aper have been
presented at the 35th Annual Meeting of the Association for Asian
Studies, March 25, 1983, the Council on Southeast Asian Studies, Yale
University, the Economic Growth Center, Yale University, the Center for
the Canparative Study of Development ,
Brown University, and the
economics department, Northeaster n University. The author has benefited
fran the comr.ients of the participant s at those presentatio ns.
In ad~
dition helpful suggestions were made by Richard Barichello
Fred
Carstensen, Victor Doherty, iobert Evenson, Yujiro llayami, 'Samuel
Popkin, Carl Pray, Louis Putterman, and James C. Scott.

Over the ninete enth and twenti eth centur ies,
South

and

Southe ast

partic ipated
compa nying

Asia

became

increa singly

in the worldw ide growth
trends

rights in land

the econom ies of

comme rcializ ed

in intern ationa l

includ ed an elabor ation

of

Ac

COIIUllerce.

the system of

proper ty

and gradua l disma ntling of proper ty rights .in man

slaver y and corvee ).

and

(debt

Fundam ental change s in the system of taxati on were

also eviden t.
The

paper

repres ents a first attemp t

as

part

of

a larger

on-goi ng projec t to explai n the trends in the system s of prope
rty rights
with a partic ular focus on
simple model of induce d
again st experi ence in
effor t is
period .
each of

prope rty rights in land.

instit ution al

a

elabor ated and tested

South and South east Asia.

an increa sed unders tandin g
An

change is

In the proces s

A by-pro duct

of

the

of Asian econom ic histor y in

the

advant age of the compa rative

approa ch arises becaus e while

the econom ies experi enced a simila r set of

trends in

relati ve

prices as integr ation into the world economy became more compl
ete, tht.-:-e
was also a substa ntial amoun t of
terms of

their

rights polici es

divers ity among the count ries

indige nous system s

both in

of proper ty rights and the proper ty

of the colon ial powers (for those count ries

which were

direc tly coloni zed).
In the first sectio n a model of induce d
is presen ted.

instit ution al

change

Trends in relati ve produc t and factor prices are discus 

sed in Sectio n II.

Case studie s includ ing Thaila nd,

the Philip pines are taken up in Sectio n III.

Buma, India, and

Conclu sions are dra~~

in

2

Section

rv.

Section V.

Finally,

implication s for future research are sketched in

3

Sec lion I:

A Supply and Demand Model of Induced

Inslilutio nal Change:

Property Rights in Land
Just as

the demand for technical change responds to trends in

relative factor prices, it is argued in the induced institutio nal chang~
approach, that the demand for institutio nal change responds in a sirnila:::fashion.

The

approach

is

described

within

the supply

and

demand

paradigm as a means of organizin g the analysis.
The

demand

for institutio nal

change arises when

some

gain

cannot be captured under current institutio nal arrangeme nts. 1 Changes in
relative
changes

factor
in

or product prices,

technolog y,

and

changes

changes

gover11I'.lent are among the important

in

in

the size

of markets,

the basic decision

rules of

exogenous influence s that create lhe

disequili bria in which current institutio nal arrangeme nts fail
for the full
benefits

capture

of

for changing

economies of

scale,

gains.

The common sources of

institutio ns
reduction

of

have included
risk

the potential

the achieveme nt

or transactio n

ameliorat ion of external ities, incomplet e markets,

lo allo~

and

cost,

of

or the

market failure.

All of these factors affect the demand for institutio nal change.
In
appreciat ion
in

the specific case

and

the syster:i of

in the relative price of a factor

the demand for an

factor

of

induce

institutio n
an

increase

to define
in

the

an

will induce an increase
property rights

benefits

utilizatio n of that system of property rights.

property rights,

derived

in

thal

from

the

Thus an appreciat ion of

the relative price of a factor will increase the demand for establish ing
a system of property rights in that factor

and increase the use of that

4

system.
The

analysis of the demand for institutional

situations in which there
only attainable

are potential benefits to some party that are

through the creation

arrangements.

change concer.ns

The factors

of

a new

set

of

institutional

that affect the demand for change are

then

the factors that serve to create the potential benefits for the users of
institutional arrangements.
however,

on

Whether change will indeed occur

the supply of institutional change --

capability of the fundamental institutions
a-::-rangernents.
institutional

2

The

capability

innovation.

the willingness anJ

of government to provide new

depends

As in

in

part

on

past

of

institutions.

The knowledge stock in

experience in production,

previously existing set of
research on institutions.
can affect the supply of
institutions

and

the

cost

the technical change case,

depends in part upon the stock of existing kno~ledge on
operation

depends,

trade,

of

the cost

the desi£n

and

turn depends upon

and distribution as well as the

institutions

and

the nature and

degree of

Just as investments in basic science research
technical change,

research (especially in

investments in

educational

legal studies and the social

sciences) can effect the supply of institutional change through both the
creation and borrowing
dition to the effects
new institutions

institutional

of the stock of knowledge,

depends upon the factor

institutional design.
The

of new ideas in

In ad-

the cost of supplying

prices of the factors used in

Implementation costs will also affect the supply.

willingness to provide

depend on the cost;

design.

new arrangements does not

solely

it also importantly depends on the private benefits

and costs of providing the change to the agents who are in a position to

5

provide

change,

the

elite

fundamental institutions
power

will

thus

institutional
elite's

of

have

a

decision

a society and
significant

arrangements which

incentives

maximize social

will

be

welfare;

makers

are

of

The

the initial distribution of

impact

on

supplied.

consistent

government.

with

the
In

some

actions

in other cases their

of

new

cases

the

kinds

that

incentives

serve to
may not be

compatible.
The

provision of new institutional arrangements has

good characteristic.
change (arising out

In
of

addition to being affected by
the self-interest of

subjects)

the demand for
and

supply of

chan~e (in part reflecting the self-interests of the elite),
affected by ideology and conventional wisdom. 3
should

and

how it

argues that ideology
problem,

to reduce

self-interest.
action.

does operate
is

a public

it is also

Notions of how the world

affect institutional

design.

North

used by the state to ameliorate the free-rider

the incentives

to act only on

the basis of narrow

Ideology thus facilitates the organization of collective

In the colonial property rights development setting, different

colonial powers had different
property rights and

ideologies concerning the organization of

those ideologies and

the conventional wisdoms that

accompanied them changed over time.
Institutional
the

demand

for

institutional
conditions
change.

in

change then

and

supply

response

in

the next

of
one

arises

change
period

in

through the interaction of
dynamic

becomes

part

sequences.
of

The

the initial

period thus affecting the subsequent

path

of

In the property rights case there was often a gradual evolution

6

of

arrangements

from

complicated systems.

simple

changes

to increasingly

elaborate

The approach is summarized in Table 1.

and

7

Table l:

Supply and Demand Model
Property Rights in Land

of

Induced

Institution al

Change:

Endogenous Variables
Institution al Arrangement s:

legal provisions
defining property
rights in land and in particular the
degree of security of land rights

Utilization of the existing institution al arrangement s:
the degree to which cultivators or
owners made use of the system
Exogenous Variables
Demand for Institution al Change
Relative Product and Factor Prices
Basic Rules of Government
Technology
Size of Market
Sources of Gains from Innovation
Capital gains
Amelioratio n of Incomplete Markets 1 Externaliti es 1 Market Failure,
and Common Property Resource Problems
Risk Sharing
Achievement of Economies of Scale
Reductions of Transaction Cost
Supply of Institution al Change
Cost of Innovation
Stock of Knowledge
Implementat ion Costs
Basic Institution s
Ideology
Conventiona l Wisdom
Private Returns to Elite Decision Makers
Interaction of Demand and Supply:

Dynamic Sequences

8

Section II:

Nineteenth and Twentieth

Century Asian Trends in

kelative

Product and Factor Prices
In the supply and demand model of institutional change brieflv

sketched in Section I,
trends

in

relative

establislment of

attention is
factor

focused on

prices in

the important

detennining

more elaborate systems

of

role of

the deraand for Lhe

property rights.

Thus in

order to apply the model, an examination of those trends is needed.
In
these

an

effort to provide

trends both direct

some

preliminary documentation

and indirect evidence will be utilized.

on
The

indirect evidence comes from the trends in the tenns of trade, the ratio
of

the export price

impor.t

price of

incentives

of

manufactured

afforded

international
division of
gains from

land-intensive
goods.

to an econooy

trade.

agricultural

The trends

The terms of

by
in

the terms of

the increases

in

to the

trade measure the

the opportunity

the gains from trade among the two
trade are

products

of engaging in

trade

reflect the

trading partners.

real income

made

The

possible by

trading.
In a closed economy (no interenational trade), real land rents
(the

charge for the use of

the services of

sensitive to population density.
tendency for real land

land

in

production)

As population density rises there is a

rents to appreciate

with respect to real wages.

At low population densities real wages tend to be high realtive

land

rents.

This

close

are

association

between

real

land

to real

renLs

and

population density is, however, broken when the economy engages in large

scale international trade.

Now relative

produce prices are determined

on world markets rather than within the econooiy itself.

Real land rents

9

are now linked to the endowments of land, labor, and capita l,
produc tion
techno logy, and the extern al tenns of trade.
a simple genera l
aanufa ctured )
agricu lture,

equili brium model
and

three

mobile

with

factor s

capita l

of

and

Thus it is possib le to use

two

goods

produc tion

labor) ,

to

(agric ultura l and
(land

predic t

specif ic

to

the trends

in

relati ve factor prices . 4 While the result s for the trends in
real wages
are somewhat ambigu ous and depend on

the param eter values of the factor

shares , employ ment shares , and elasti cities of substi tution ,
the result s
for the trend

in

real land

rents are

much more clearc ut.

Real land

rents are very sensit ive to the trend in the tenns of trade
(a result of
assumi ng that land is specif ic to agricu lture) .
the relati ve
fran

price of

the agricu ltural produc t rises,

the other sector

capita l are,

This follow s becaus e as

(manu factur ing)

howev er,

into

agricu lture.

imper fect subst itutes for land.

seek to expand agricu ltural outpu t in
land rents are bid up.

resour ces
Labor

move
and

Thus as people

respon se to the favora ble prices ,

Thus we can use the trend in the terms of trade

as a proxy for the trend in real land rents.
Data on the terms of trade are presen ted in Table 2.

The data

on the Thai terms of trade have the advant age of direct ly reflec
ting the
ratio

of the price of the argicu ltural to the manuf acture d

cover a long time period ~
agricu ltural prices from
1925 period ,
the 1930s.

The data indica te a relati ve appre ciatio n of
the 1860s to 1912,

and finall y appre ciatio n
Overa ll,

produc t and

the relati ve

appre ciated over the whole period .

declin e

over

the 1912 to

from the mid-I 920s to the end of

price

of

the agricu ltural produc t
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Table 2:

Nineteenth

Twentieth Century Trends in the Tenns of Trade
......................and...........
.......................................

Country or Region

Rate of Change
in percent
per year

Notes and Sources

1865-67 to 1912
1912 to 1925
1925 to 1939

1.41
-3.39
1.03

Export price of rice
divided by import
price of white or grey
shirting, respectivel y;
Feeny (1982, pp. 17 and
131).

1865-67 to 1939
1865-67 to 1940

0.47
1.52

.......................................................................Thailand:
or 1.55
or -1.92
or 1.18

or
or

0.85
1.95

Burma:
1870-71
1890-92
1912-13
1925-26

to
to
to
to

1912-13
1912-13
1925-26
1939-40

1870-71 to 1939-40
1890-92 to 1939-40

1.90
-1.33
-0.41

1.62
or -1.44
or 0.82

External terms of
a
trade,
or Int rnal
6 Aye
terms of trade;
Hlaing (1964, pp. 145148).

0.81
0.55

India:
1861-69 to 1906-14
1906-14 to 1931-39

0.90
-0.79

1861-69 to 1931-39

0.29

1903-08 to 1934-39

-0.14

Net barter terms of
trade, index of export
prices divided by
index of import
prices; Bhatia (1969,
PP• 417-419).
or -0.51

Laspeyres and Paasche
indices of terms of
trade respectivel y;
Appleyard (1969, P•
190).

11

Table 2 continued :
1888 to 1914
1914 to 1936

0.08

1888 to 1936

0.65

1.12

Paasche index of terms
of trade; Birnberg and
Resnick (1975, p. 285).

Philippin es:
1902 to 1925
1925 to 1938
1902 to 1938

0.51
-2.86

Paasche index of terms
of trade; Birnberg and
Resnick (1975, p. 306).

-0.77

........................................................................
8

b

Index of export prices divided by index of import prices.
Index of domestic paddy price divided
consumer goods imports.

by

index of the unit value

of

12

On
indices,

the basis of the trends reflected in these

one would expect that

trade were improving,

in

real land

during which

the tenns of

rents would have been appreciating and

that the overall trend

in

preciation.

confirming

Evidence

periods

terms of trade

real land

rents would have been

the predictions

will

one of apdiscussed

be

below.
Much

the same

trends

Thailand are also apparent
1912 the ratio
goods rose.

of

in

the terms

of

trade

for Burma (see Table 2).

evident

for

From the 1870s to

the price of rice or paddy to the prices of imp.orted

Fran 1912 to 1925 the terms of trade declined and then rose

for one series

and

fell for the other over

the 1925

to 1940

period.

Again, overall the terms of trade appreciated.
Data on

the Indian terms of trade presented by

Appleyard and Birnberg and Resnick for the later
same impression as

the Thai and Burmese indices:

the 1860s to 1910s

and decline

These

terms

of

trade

indices

in

period,

Bhatia and by

give much the

an appreciation from

the interwar period (see
for

India

are

not

ideal

Table 2).
in

that

manufactured goods were both exported and imported, as were agricultural
products.
relative

Still

the bulk

to the import

of

bundle.

the exports
Hore

are

land-intensive

disaggregated indices

goods

would be

·desirable.
Finally, Birnberg and Resnick present evidence on the terms of
trade for the Philippines (see Table 2).

There appears to have been an

appreciation over the 1902 through 1925 period,
through 1938, and decline for the overall period.

sharp decline from 1925

13
The
2

points

sample of trends in the tenns of trade presente d in Table

to an appreci ation

century until

World War I.

over

the period from

Therefo re one would

the mid-nin eteenth

expect that

over

period there would have been increase d producti on and speciali zation
export activiti es and an appreci ation

in real land rents.

the
in

Each of the

predicti ons will be examined .
Data

on

the trends in rice exports and cotton goods

for Thailand and Burma
appear
of

are

to have increase d,

trade

were

goods

imports (the

While rice export data

paddy product ion trends,

Indeed rice exports

especia lly in periods during which the terms

increasi ngly favorab le.

expansio n of cotton
countri es).

presente d in Table 3.

Similar ly

century

of

was a rapid

in each of the

are only an indirect indicato r

of

there is evidence that producti on responde d to

the accounts and

period)

there

leading import

the price incentiv es reflecte d in the terms of trade.
corrobo rated by

imports

the

rapid

measure s (largely

increase s

in

the

The conclusi on is
for

the twentie th

area

under

paddy

cultivat ion in both Burma and Thailan d. 5
Thus it
trade.

But

that

appears that product ion trends followed
happened to real land

manufac tured goods?

The use of the price of land

rent assumes that the trend

time

series on

fleshing

out

measured

in

rice or

In Table 4 several crude measure s of real land rent

trends are presente d.

land prices. 6

rents,

the terms of

in land

rather than actual

rents is reflecte d in the trend in

While data on actual land rents would be preferab le, long
rents

are

general ly not

the broad trends,

should be more than adequate .

however,

availab le.
the real land

For purposes of

price

series
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Table 3:

Growth of Agricultural Exports and Manufactured Goods Imports

.........................................................................
Quantity
of rice
exports

Value of
rice
exports

Value of
cotton
goods
imports

1864 to 1910
1910 to 1925
1925 to 1940

4.43
1.78
-0.85

5.64
·4 .14
-3.80

4.36
6.10
-3.19

1864 to 1940

2.84

3.41

3. 16

Notes and Sources
..........................................................................
Thailand:

Bunna:

1870-75
1876-80
1905-10
1911-15
1920-25
1921-25

Feeny (1982, PP•
127-130)

Quantity of
cotton
piece goods
imported
1905-10
1911-15
1920-25
1921-25
1935-40
1936-40

3.21

1870-75 to 1935-40
1876-80 to 1936-40

2.25

to
to
to
to
to
to

5.95
3.51

1.06

3.88

1.21

-3.29

Aye Hlaing (1964,
PP• 95, 105 and 110)

-2.95
2.72
3.27
2.21

.........................................................................

15

The

results presen ted in

When the terms of trade apprec iated,

Table 4 confonn to our predic tions.
real land prices apprec iated, when

the terms of trade decline d, so did real land rents.

Thus it appears to

be reasona ble to use the terms of trade as a proxy for the trend in
real
land

rents when direct

furthe r corrobo rated by

evidenc e is

unavai lable.

the widesp read reports

of

This conclu sion

is

an apprec iation

of

land prices over the mid-ni neteen th to early twentie th century period.
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Table 4:

Rate of Change in Real Land Prices in Percent

per Year
........... ........... .........•. ........... ........... ...•.......
.........
Land Price
Deflated by
Price of
Rice

Country

Land Price
Deflated by
Price of
Manufacture d
Goods

and Sources
.......................................................Notes
...........
.........

Thailand:

1915 to 1925
1925 to 1940

-0.31
2.58

1915 to 1940

1.41

2.03 or

3.25

2.52

-1 .09 or -0.14
4.17 or 4.55
2.65

Deflated by price of
white or grey shirting
respectively ; Feeny
(1982, PP• 20 and 33)

Bunna:

1889-90 to 1920-21

Deflated by domestic
paddy price; deflated by
unit value of consumer
goods imports; Aye Hlaing
(1964, pp. 128 and 147-48)

............... •'• ..........................................................

----------------------------------------------------------------------
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Section III:

Case Studies

Given

the generally favorable terms of

the last half

of the nineteent h century and given

preciatio n in

real land

rents and the expansion

trade movements

over

the concomita nt
of

ap

the productio n of

land-inte nsive agricultu ral products, the simple supply and demand model
of institutio nal change predicts

that. there would be an increase in the

demand for more elaborate and secure systems
and

a great.er utilizatio n

system.
land

of

of property rights in land

the institutio nal

arrangeme nts of

The evidence on the trends in the demand for property rights in

and the responses of the central authoriti es to those demands will

now

be

examined.

generaliz ations

will

In
be

the

process

made,

a

tending

number
to

of

blur

rather
the

understoo d

relative

that.

as

the modern transport ation

price of agricultu ral products rose

in

sweeping

diversity

experienc e among regions and over time within each country.
be

that

It

of

should

system spread,
previousl y less

the
com

mercializ ed areas and the whole process was repeated.
The strategy here is to describe the "traditio nal"
system of property rights in land

that existed in the early

century period and then to trace the major
time.

changes

indigenou s
nineteent h

that occurred

over

The trends in Thailand, Burma, India, and the Philippin es will be

briefly sketched.

Thailand
The early nineteent h century system of property rights in land
in

Thailand was essential ly one of

cultivato r

continued to use

usufruct rights.

the land

he

(or

she)

Al

long as

had the right

the
to

18
exclude others from using it,
it

as

collateral

to

sell it,

obtain

pass it on to his heirs, or u·se

a loan.

depended on the payment of land

The maintenance of
If the land

taxes.

the rights

was abandoned for

more than three consecutive years, rights were forfeited.
Over

the first half

of

the nineteenth

century there

gradual increase in the degree of commercialization
and

increasing ties

was a

of the Thai econony

to regional and world markets.

7

During the fourth

reign (1851-1868) land rights were made more fonnal through the issuance
of title deeds based on paddy land tax receipts.
paddy

land

for which

introduced.
provinces

In

the tax

1882-1883 for some major

titles based

on

issued for. the first time.
to officials
were

also

was based

the area

on

In 1867-68 titles for
the area

harvested were

Central Plain rice producing

owned

rather than harvested were

The titles could be obtained by

the tax receipts

for the previous

available to give cultivators of

rights to exclude others while

presenting

ten years.

newly

developing the land

Documents

cleared

areas

for three

the

years at

which time rights were forfeited if the area had not been developed.
The appreciation
the property rights

system became

occurred (the expected gain
the transaction cost
responded

by

procedures.
however,

of land prices continued and deficiencies in

standard
of

Frequent

land

disputes

from obtaining ownership rose and justified

of disputation).

issuing
The lack

apparent.

During the 1880s the governr.ient

fonns

a central

and

place

prescribing
for

that more than one set of titles could

land

standardized

records

meant,

be issued for the same

piece of land and disputes became increasingly frequent.
The response was the passage of a more comprehensive land

law
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in

1892.

It

created

nine types

of land,

includin g

land

held

by

religiou s institut ions, royal land, residen tial land, agricul tural land,
land used for mining,

forest and jungle land,

and waterway land.

The

agricul tural land category included three types of orchards and gardens,
upland land, two types of paddy land, and garden lands.
made for transfer able
there

were

title deeds which could be used as collater al and

documen ts

transac tions.

Provisio ns were

and

procedu res

Homeste ading

for

provisio ns

the registra tion

were

included

of

as

such

well

procedu res for converti ng old documen ts to the newly created ones.
1892

land

law replaced the earlier rather

ad hoc

system with

as
The

a more

compreh ensive one.
However,

major

adminis tration remained .
precise descrip tions

deficien cies
The lack

in

the

legislat ion

of central land

of the boundar ies of the land

and

its

title offices

and

in

question

meant

that disputes over ownersh ip could not be easily resolved and land could
not be unambig uously identifi ed.
in the Rangsit

area

These problems became very conspici ous

(to the northea st of Bangkok ,

a major

commerc ial

rice-exp orting region in the Central Plain) during the boom of the 1890s
when a number of very bitter land disputes arose.
Survey Departm ent

was diverted 'from

As a result the Royal

its work on

mapping and in

·1896

began cadastr al surveys, initiall y concent rating on the Rangsit area but
later

expandin g

into

~ost of the major

rice-exp orting

areas in

the

Central Plain.
In
provinc ial
adopted .

1901
land

the Torrens
record

offices

system of
and

land

cadastra l

titling

with

surveys was

central
formally

From 1901 to 1909 eleven land record offices were establis hed.
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By

1909-10

593,069

title deeds had been

(637,001 for the whole
(1,671,000
European

kinedom)

ha for the whole

issued in

the Central Plain

and the area surveyed was 1,605, OU(J lia

kingdom).

The work was

carried

experts (mainly on loan from the Indian Civil Service)

addition to conducting
Thai staff.

the survey work also

provided

training

by

who in
to th~

After 1909 the Royal Survey Department was transferred back

to its original mapping duties and the rate of increase in
area

out

plunged.

The nunber of

title deeds on

file (primarily

Central Plain) did, however, continue to increase;
of title deeds on

file for the whole

the surveyed
in

the

the rate of increase

kingdon was 4.69 percent per yea-:-:

over the 1905-06 to 1941 period.
The

syster.1 was incompletely

realized.

lack

A

record keeping and administration reduced the benefits.

of

diligent

Not all farmers

obtained or were able to obtain the proper documents for land which they
held.

Areas

outside

the Central Plain

were

especially incompletely

served by cadastral surveys.
After 1909 there were a nunber of minor changes
implemented
procedures

during
were

the

pre-World

changed and

Restrictions were placed on

War

II

period.

Administrative

fees were instituted on
the sale of public

with the intent of curbing land speculation.

to the syster.1

land

lands in

transfers.

1916 and 1919

Finally, in 1938-39 a ne\o/

schedule of agricultural land taxes was established.
A

more major

amended to allow

change was made

for the registration

in

1936 when the 1901 la\o/ was

of claims on

unsurveyed

lands.

While traditionally claims on apparently unclaimed lands were registered
with the village headman, the 1936 law required registration at the Land
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Department.
European

The 1936 law represented a compromise between the elaborate

cadastral

survey

system of

implementation of that system.

the 1901 law and

The compromise was extended in 1954 when

a new comprehensive land law was enacted.
land

certificates

leaders and allow
land

It provides for a variety of

documents that give different levels of security

Occupation

as

district officers
utilization.
ficers)

are

issued

the holder

long as it

is

the incomplcLt.:

by

of land

village headman

to temporarily

being developed.

and

canr,1une

exclude others froo usin;;
Reserve

licences issued by

also give rights for temporary occupation

Exploitation testimonials

rights.

(again

subject to

issued by district of-

confirm that utilization of previously reserved land

has taken

place and confer rights that are transferable and inheritable.
full

title deeds issued

by

cadastral

survey

and

Finally

providing ·for the

recording of land transactions are issued by officials in the provincial
capital.
rights

The 1954
in

code

Thailand~

is

the basis of

Tl,e major

the current systen of

changes

in

land

the Thai property rights

system are sunmarized in Table 5.
Even within the parameters of the compromise
1954 code, the system is still incomplete.
the late 1960s of the area

covered by

Only 12 percent of

the total area

reserve

18 percent

licenses,

three

types of land

had full title deeds,

had

played

an

important

conflicting
role

in

systematic and elaborate systems

in the

Ingram reports estimates for
docunents.

4 percent had

exploitation testimonials,

percent had no formal legal documentation at all.
Disputes over

embodied

anc

65

8

to the same piece of

land

causing the government to develop

more

claims

of land

rights in

Thailand.

In the
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Table 5:

Major Change in the Thai System of Property Rights
in Land, 1850-1954

Period

Institutional Change

Early Nineteenth Century

Usufruct Rights, existing system

1851-1868

Issue title deeds based on the area
harvested

1882-1883

Issue title deeds based on the area owned

1880s

Prescribe standardized forns and procedur~b
in an effort to reduce land disputes

1892

Enact a comprehensive land la~ with
prbvision for title deeds and use of land
as collateral

1901

Institute a Torrens syster.i of land
registration and conduct cadastral
surveys

1936

Amendment to 1901 law allowing for
ownership based on registration with the
Land Department of claims on unsurveyed
lands

1954

Enact a new land law providing for a
variety of docunents and levels of
security of land rights

Source:

Feeny (1982).
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early

twentieth century period different ial access to the fonnal syster,

and the ability of

powerful governmen t officials to manipulat e the :and

records system allowed elites to obtain
t.he tradition al

cultivato rs.
lowed

system

equal

subverted by

have

been

Today intro-fam ilial

some heirs

system of

would

to gain

ownership

controlle d

which unde~

by

hanesteadi r:;~

manipulat ion of the system has

at the expense

inheritan ce by

to land

all

of others.

9

The tradition al

surviving children is

more literate and knowledge able siblings,

al-

frequentl y

resulting

in a

clash between the use of the "modern" system and tradition al inheritan ce
practices .

The central governmen t has been increasin gly involved in tlie

adjudicat ion of

local disputes

which

in

fonner times would have been

settled by local officials .
In the Thai case
increase

in

the appreciat ion

the demand for a more

defining property rights in land.

of

land

systemati c set

of

prices led to an
procedure s

The governmen t in fact

responded to

the der.1ands and gradually a new system of property rights evolved.
factors contribut ed to the willingne ss and capabilit y of

for

\Jha t

the governnen t

to supply the institutio nal change?
In part the new system evolved as a practical solution

to the

land

disputes that became so canmon as land became more valuable.

The

cost

of

the

supplying

a new

set

of

institutio ns

availabi lity of European systems and officials stock of

knowledge and practice on

in land.
has

lowered

vigorousl y exploited

gave the governmen t an

by

by the existence of a

the organizat ion of property rights

Over time that system was increasin gly indigeniz ed.

never been

system also

was

in

Thailand,

enhanced

land

While it

a better cadastral
tax

revenue

base.
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Finally,

private and social interests coincided.

gove:::Tlr.lent officials,
the more

secure

participated in the land

system

of

property rights

incentive to supply the new system because
gains.
could

Members of the elite,
boan and benefited frun

in

they

land.

had

an

too would share in

t.l1e

They

By separating land ownership from land use, members of the elite
become

non-cultiva ting

capture the capital

gains.

landowners

with

secure title and

thus

Under the traditional usufruct system this

was not possible.
During

the 1850

to

1912

period

the Thai

government

another fundamental change in its property rights systems.

made

It gradually

disnantled a system of property rights in man (corvee and debt slavery).
The chanie was facilitated
. d 10
t h e per1.o.

a significant decline in real wabes over

The development of more efficient wage-labor markets

immigration of Chinese
taxation.

by

workers made

corvee a less

attractive

fom of

With the general rise in commercial ization, money taxes could

be substituted for taxes in

kind and

in

labor services.

The rise of

property rights in land created a new asset for use as collateral.
motivations
goals

and

of the monarch in
the desire

factors were important

to be seen as

powerful

the

king

opposition

as

could

progressive

well.

By

remove

in

an internation al
Domestic political

gradually abolishing slavery and

the control of

noble families and

with respect to the nobles.

The

abolishing slavery included humanitaria n

seting in which slavery was increasingly condemned.

corvee,

and

labor

thus consolidate

services

fror.

his position

Thus both economic (decline in real wages,

rise in factor and product markets) and political factors (both danestic
and

internation al)

underwrote

a sweeping transformat ion

of

the Thai
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property rights

system fran

one of

property rights in

man

to one of

property rights in land.

Burma
The

property rights systems in land

Bunna were not unlike the systems
property

rights

in

man

in

and man
11

in Thailand.

the fonns

of

in pre-colonial

There were systens of

corvee and

debt

slavery.

Traditional property rights in land were largely usufruct rights, rights
were retained only through use,
been

abandoned

others.
some

although

for 12 years before

it

technically land
was

had to have

available for the use

of

Land could often be sold, mortgaged, or inherited, although in

districts

district.

land

There

could

only be

sold

to

someone

from

the same

was a significant amount of ·regional variation in the

property rights system.

As in the Thai case

all land

belonged to the

king but the populace was allowed to clear land and retain it and obtain
title documents.
property of

An

the king and

local officials.
rights.

additional

category

was often

of

land

was

the absolute

allocated for crown service

or to

Vacant lands were available for clearing and usufruct

Finally,

glebe

land

rights did not depend on

continued oc-

cupation.
The

British

were

perplexed

by

the

system

of

shiftinE

cultivation practiced by Burman fanners and were opposed to the frequent
abandonnent of fields.
usufruct system under
using land

In

fact

Furnival reports that the traditional

which a cultivator could only exclude others from

while it was in fact in use,

system of shifting

cultivation,

in interaction with the fallO\-'

did sometimes result

in

insufficient
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fallow periods.

As a result of British opposition to the abandoment of

fields and in a desire

to create a peasant proprietary system,

hanesteadin g and fallow tax rates
revenue system.

were built into

the land

spe::ia:

rights and

British motivation included the desire to build a land

tax revenue base to support
seen as a reaction

gover11Ment operations.

to previous

experience in

Policy can also be

India in

wanted to create a class of peasant cultivators .

that officials

The overriding

basis

of land policy was a belief in the efficiency of private property rights
and a laissez-fai re ideology.
Ne\.:ly cleared land was initially exempt from land taxes.
tax rates

applied

to land

that

was registered as

being fallow.

unregistere d fallow land higher tax rates were charged.

Low
On

After occupying

land for 12 years and paying the land taxes, title deeds we~e issued and
land could then be used as collateral.
The
increased

use of

the British

significant ly

nineteenth century.

during

system of
the

rice

From the 1870s on

property rights
export

boom

of

in

land

the

late

fanners decided with increasing

frequency to pay taxes on fallowed land in order to retain their rights.
As land

was used for collateral,

frequent

over

depression

of

land

the 1908-30 period
the 1930s.

In

and

the late

alienation became
rapidly

increased

1930s and

early

increasingly
during

the

1940s,

the

colonial government responded with tenancy legislation , thus restricting
the property rights in land which they had earlier created.
In Bunna
the indigenous
system with

the ideology

systems

alienable

of

of

the colonial power interacted with

property rights and fanning to create a new

rights

in

land

but also with

provisions

for

27

homesteading and fallow periods.

The motivations included the creation

of

a society of peasant cultivator-owners

who would have the incentive

to

cultivate

to

efficiently.

The

desire

avoid

concentration

of

ownership was somewhat thwarted by the 1930s trend in land alienation.
As in

the Thai case,

the increase in land

demands for more secure property rights in land
of that system.
in

prices did create

and greater utilization

Because the provision and operation of that system was

the ideological

and economic interests of

the colonial govennent,

changes in the property rights system and the administrative system with
which to operate it

were forthcoming.

The institutional

arrangements

designed for Burma also reflected compromises that explicitly took
account

the traditional

fallow practices

and

traditional

into

rights

to

clearing "waste" land.

India
Any generalization about the system of property rights in land
in

India and

probably

fail

the trends in
to do

diversities found

that system are

justice

there.

quite hazardous and

to the regional,

With

that major

ethnic,

and

will

temporal

caveat in mind,

the broad

trends will, nonetheless, be examined. 12
The traditional system that the British encountered was one of
inalienable hereditary resident cultivator rights.
revenue
the

collectors

cultivators and

intermediaries
rights.

In Bengal a class of

known as zamindars acted as intermediaries
the

In

Oudh

the

talqudars

above the village level

with

land

revenue

rulers.

between
acted

as

collection

28
British law and practice varied considerably
over time.

within India and

In general, howevt:'r, the British sought. to make land private

alienable property with individual property rights being assigned to the
person

responsible for paying the land

before them,

Like Indian

tax.

the British East India Company and the colonial governnent

relied heavily on land tax revenues.

The development of property ri~hts

in land was thus inextricably linked to revenue policy.
administrative
experience in
rebions.

govern::ients

"frontier"
"older"

Thus

moved

within

areas affected

Madras

experience

India

for

practice in
affected

As the British
over

100

the newly

Bombay,

Uttar

yea-::-s,
governed
Pradesh

experience impacted upon the Punjab, and Bengal practice was transferred
to·Banares.

Local conditions

particular its actual

also affected the system adopted and

practice.

In addition,

colonial government thought that it
of

the indigenous elite in

fected land settlements.

in

the degree to which the

was expedient to co-opt the loyalty

governing the country often

profoundly af

Thus the post-Mutiny period witnessed a number

of policy reversals.
Finally, an additional important variable in the detennination
of

the land

British

system

officials in

was

the prevailing

London and

in

ideology

India.

of

the responsible

The rise and decline

of

utilitarian thought was reflected in British policy in India.
As a sweeping generalization,
practice may be distineuished.
•given

to the tax collectors

landlords to the cultivators.

two

basic paradigms of British

In the zamindar system land rights were
as

a landed gentry

who then

became

the

In the ryotwari systeD, land rights were

instead invested in the peasant cultivators themselves.
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The

zarninda:- systen was first created by_

LorJ Cornwallis

ir.

Bengal in 1793 and was congruent with his Whig belief in the superiori~y
of

government by

cultivators

to

a landed
ensure

gentry

who

efficient

would

in

practice.

turn
The

supervise the
relatively

transaction cost of this strategy made it quite attractive.
having to determine the ownership
of each individual land

of each piece of land

t.ransaction ,

by dealing with a single landowner.

attenpts at

direct

of

Rather thi:in

anci keep tracJ:

large areas could be administere d
The political advantages

the enhanced loyalty of the traditional elite.
very entrenched class

zamindars in

settlement with

lo~

includec

Cornwallis encountered a

Bengal who bad thwarted earlier

the cultivators .

It

is

easy to

understand his choice of sett.lements .
The
component of

zanindar system was first used.in
the Bengal zamindar

settlement,

Bengal.

the distributio n of land

rights to zamindar revenue collectors as landlords,
of Madras

and in Uttar Pradesh.

It

An important

was copied in parts

was later extended to a nllr:lber of

areas after the 1857 Mutiny in an effort to restore order and loyalty.
The
1790s by
aros~

ryotwari system was gradually developed

Munro and copied in

in part because

Its heavy

demands

the Bombay

there was no

on

It

knowledge of the area and the ability to conduct

settler:ient surveys were met by

officers

like Munro

who

had

the indigenous

system in Madras

Presidency in the 1830s.

existing class of local zamindars.

detailed

knowledge of

in Madras in the

extensive
language.

was designed to allow

the beginning of the year)

the availabilit y
experience in
In

of

military

Madras

and

addition the land

a

revenue

the cultivator to designate (at

the fields for which he would be responsiole
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for the paynent of land taxes, an attractive feature in a region suhject
to variable rainfall.
~hile
zarnindar

the

syster.1,

Northwest

was

the ryotwari system

period of utilitarian refonns.
was reinstituted in
expendiency,

originally

Oudh

and

was

settled

introduced

After the Mutiny,
the Punjab.

In

in

through

the 1843-53

the zamindar
addition

the policy reversal was also the result

the

syster,1

to political

of a growing dis

satisfaction on

the part

alien (British)

concepts of property and their growing appreciation and

of

British officials with

the imposition of

knowledee of indigenous institutions and concepts of property.
The
nuch

more

ryotwari system required detailed cadastral surveys and a

ccxnplex

administrative machinery.

affected the thinkihg
early

of

and also based

theory
the

In the Bombay Presidency the implementation

was especially vigorous. 13

was be 5un in 1835.

rent

Mill and many other British officials in

nineteenth century.

of that thinking

Ricardian

A complex cadastral survey

It classified land into nine soil quality categories

its relative land

quality rankings

on clb1ate,

market

access, distance to village, village population, and likely availability
of manure.
rankings,
rent.

\Jhile the detailed land and t.it.le surveys gave relative rent
the governr.ient still needed a way of detennining the absolute

Officials decided to use trial

above the level
would follow.

expand.
of

of rent,

land

If t.axes were

and

error.

If taxes were

set

abandornnent and declines in cultivation
set helm.;

the rents,

cultivation

would

By examining the revenue history of an area, the absolute level

t.axes needed to capture the Ricardian rents for the government could

be detennined.

Technically the land belonged to the government and the
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cultivators paid

taxes as rent

on

efficiency would be enhanced hy

the land.

Officials believed that

assessing renLs that were approxm.ately

equal to the Ricar.dian rent.
McAlpin (1984)
Bombay

Presidency

studied)

(or

at least

.
perfonned we.J.......

the agricultural

sector

those areas that have been

Capital accunulated,

~

and land prices rose.
secure.

argues that

in

the

carefully

cultivation increased,

Clear titles were issued and tenure was made more

Taxes were rationalized and lowered in the process.

of the success was clue to the adherence to Ricardian rent theory and hO\,
much

was

due

to the favorable

agricultural

prices

experienced

is,

however, difficult to detemine.
The
created

introduction of secure pioperty rights in

new credit

experienced

the

transport costs,
prices.
fell into
castes.

markets.

spread

of

Over.

land

in India

the nineteenth century the econor:1y

"law and

a rise in cor.unercial

order",

a marked

agriculture,

reduction

in

and a rise in land

In some areas land taxes were set at high levels and zamindars
arrears,

often

losing

land

to moneylender and

commercial

Land alienation often significantly altered the distribution of

land holdings that had originally been envisaged by the British.
Colonial officials
tenant rights.

also

Beginning in

1886

security to tenants were passed.
tenant rights after twelve

increasingly became
a series of laws

concerned
to grant

over

greater

Many of these provided for hereditary

continuous

years of occupation.

landlords could easily circumvent the restrictions by

Naturally

"rotating"

their

tenants.
In India we can see that political expediency, utilitarian and
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\~hip, ideologies, indigenous systems, and the practical considerations of
transaction cost

in

creating and

adninistering a land

rights-revenul'

system all interacted to produce a number of distinct systems which then
had their own individual evolutions.
quite significant impact

Creating alienable land also had a

on the Indian society as well as the operation

of its agricultural markets.

Philippines

14

In pre-Spanish. times there was traditional communal
of

lan<l

and

a fairly

elaborate

system of

Individuals had usufruct rights in land.
of debt

slavery under

property rights

ownership
in

man.

There were several categories

which slaves owed their

owners

fixed shares of

their crop output.
The Spanish viewed debt
usury and moved to abolish it.
property rights in

land

slavery as the product of anti-social
They also introduced private individual

and alienability.

Title to the fonnerly corn-

munal lands was generally issued to the indigenous chief.
sane

royal land

was donated

to religious

available for homesteading under

estates

and some

was made

the provision that unless it

was kept

in use, the title would revert to the crown.
of land

In addition,

Over time the alienability

often resulted in mestizo moneylenders acc1JJT1ulating

control of

land through loan defaults.
While

in

the technical sense

state until the late nineteenth century,
sale,

lease,

and inheritance prevailed.

land

was the property of

the

in practice private ownership,
With the sugar export boom of

33
and

century

the nineteenth

1885.

accompanied

titles

issuing clear land

government began

the colonial

which

values

disputes became more common.

land

agricultural canmercialization,
response

land

in

rise

In
in

Confusion, however, remained.
next

The

the United States.
land

rights,

which

took

major step came with the new colonial government of
In response to the confusion in the documentation of

years

of

vacant

and

lands

lead

were

the mechanism

The desire

the sugar export booms.

however,

Provisions

to complete.

six

homesteading
during

followed by a survey

a Cadastral Act was passed in 1913 9

for

made

was frequently used

to avoid

land

taxes did,

to a failure to acquire formal title to occupied

Like the systems in Thailand and Burma,

the

lands.

literate elites were often able

to manipulate the formal system to acquire legal title to lands that had
been cleared by others, thus contributing to a more unequal distribution
of land.

Conclusions

Section IV:

Several inductive conclusions follow from the brief discussion
of the trends in property rights systems.
land

induced

increased interest in

system of property rights in land.

First,

acquiring land

the rising value

of

and utilizing

the

The increased interest in acquiring

land led to disputes over ownership that often exposed weaknesses in the
prevailing

system of

identifying

and

administering land

rights.

A

umber of attempts at administrative solutions typically followed, often
finally resulting in the institution of a full cadastral survey.
In this

context it

is

useful to distinguish between the ef-
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fects of rising land

values on land

already under

cultivation and the

effects of rising land values in inducing an expansion in the area under
cultivation.

In the former case traditional or existing institutions to

define property rights in land came under less pressure for change.
settled

communities ownership

thus there

was

adjudicated.

less

boundaries tended

uncertainty

about

how

to be well

land

In

known and

disputes

would be

De facto rights were often enforceable even in the absence

de jure documents.

Under

these

circumstances the major

advantage of

obtaining formal documentation of land rights was the improved access to
credit that it afforded.
On

the frontier where

settlements were new,

boundaries were

not well known to all and there was great uncertainty about

the outcooe

of land disputes.

In a sense the formal procedures and documents of the

government partly

substituted for the local

mechanisms that existed

within the settled

knowledge and
communities.

enforcement
Thus on

the

frontier the demand for more precise and secure property rights in

land

tended

fact

to be greater.

frequently provided

in

New

institutional

arrangements were

in

response to the demand articulated through land

disputes.
Second,

differential

legalistic system provided
patterns of land

ownership

an

area

in

frequently

central
eroded

to the increasingly

important

favor.

This appears to

Cochin China, and the Rangsit

Inequality was

through alienation)

unequal

Elites were often very sue-

records in their

the Philippines,

Thailand. 15

formal and

avenue through which

could emerge.

cessful in manipulating land
have happened in Burma,

access

by

also

created

(although

the initial distribution of
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land

to elite groups in the Philipp ines,

On

the

other

hand,

alienat ion

Bengal,

appears

and Northw est India.

to

have

promote d

land

concen tration on Burma.
Third,

in

many

cases

major motiva ting

a

factor

goverm ent in the creatio n and admini stratio n of the land
was the desire

to collec t land-ta x revenu es.

of

the

rights system

The taxpay er was defined

as the owner, thus often conver ting an indigen ous politic al interme diary
of the traditi onal system into a full owner under the new system .
Fourth , in virtua lly all cases the legal provisi ons "exceed ed"
admini strativ e practic e in the degree of sophis ticatio n and precisi on
of
the

land

rights.

transac tions

cost

consid erable

and

This
of
much

Cadast ral surveys took

occurre d

for

two

establi shing

and

operati ng

higher

reasons .
the

Thais direct ly borrow ed)
as

additio n higher
demand ing systems
tendenc y
overly

values

stocks
of

Second, coloni al

knowled ge of institu tions

of
land

enviro ments.
had

often

human

Relativ e
prevail ed

capita l

rights

made

feasib le.

to introdu ce someth ing like the "home"
sophis ticated .

were

from which the

came from differe nt econom ic and institu tional

ecolog ical)

relativ ely high land

systems

years and even decade s to comple te and as we can

powers (and thus the stock of

well

the

than enactin g the enablin g legisla tion.

see from the Thai evidenc e are often still incomp lete.

(as

First,

Often

explic it

land

scarcit y and

for centur ies.

In

more admini strativ ely
Natura lly

there

was a

system which was often

compro mises

were

made

(for

homest eading for instanc e) in the legisla tion and additio nal compro mises
emerged in the implem entatio n of the system s and subsequ ent revisio ns
in
the legisla tion.

The 1954

Land

Code

in

Thailan d can be seen as

an
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example of such a comprcxnise.
Finally in all the cases it appears that the rise in the terms
of trade and growth of population were indeed associated with

That increase was in turn associated with an increase

real land prices.

in the demand for more precise land

rights and a greater utilization of

the existing system to increase the security
secure

system

of

land

rights

typically came in two forms.
the outcome
owners

of

a rise in

of

land

gradually evolved.

rights.
Greater

A more
securi~y

First, there was reduced uncetainty abou~

the adjudication of

landownership

disputes.

Seconds

had greater assurance that they would be able to retain long run

rights in the land.
The

evolution of

political exped_iency,
cost,

the system of

ideology

and

land

rights was affected by

conventional

and the system that immediately preceded it.

supply of and demand for institutional change played
in

the nineteenth and twentieth

in land in Asia.

wisdom,

transaction

In short, both the
an important

role

century development of property rights
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Section V:

Implicati ons for Future Research
The

paper

developme nt of

provides

an

property rights in

interpret ation
land

in

South

during the nineteent h and twentieth centuries .
approach have,
indicate

of
and

research

needed

in

comparati ve

Southeast Asia

The implicati ons of the

however, not been fully exploited .

the future

the

It is then useful to

order

to

construct

a more

complete interpret ation.
First, the stock of qualitati ve and in particula r quantitat ive

evidence on
prices,

the trends in

property rights

systems,

relative

and relative factor prices needs to be augmented .

measures of institutio nal change need
hypothesi s testing.

product

Quantitat ive

to be created to facilitat e crude

Measures of the degree of utilizatio n

rights system such as the percent of the area under

of the land

cultivati on that is

titled are an example.
Second,
explored.
is based

a nunber of

implicatio ns

of

the model

to be

For instance the demand induced model of institutio nal change
on

the premise that innovatio ns in institutio nal arrangeme nts

are made in order to capture gains previousl y unobtaina ble.
of

need

property

rights

in

land

resulting from the appreciat ion

those gains
in land

include

rents,

In the case

the capital

gains

enhanced incentive s to

invest in land productiv ity-increa sing improveme nts, and improved access
to credit markets.

From the point of view of the state, property rights

in land provided a lucrative source of tax revenues as well as potential
political benefits in the fonn of loyalty to the regime.
Evidence on
should be sought.

the magnitude

and

trends in

each of

the gains

Greater precision and security of land rights should
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enhance incentives for land development .
examine

evidence

on

rates

of

Thus it would be important t.o

investment

in

productivit y differentia ls between areas with
rights.

land

development

and

more and less secure land

Of course to the extent that land rights are first provided in

•ore fertile and commerciali zed areas,

there is

a simultaneit y problem

canplicatin g any inferences that may be drawn.
Similarly another benefit
ability

to use

markets.

land

as

of more secure land

collateral thus

improving

Thus one should observe longer debt

rii:1ts is

access

to credit

maturities and/or

real interest rates resulting from land titling.

the

lower

(Once again there is a

simultaneit y problem.)
Finally,
appreciatio n

if the appreciatio n

of the tems of trade and induced

secure property rights in
declined

land,

what happened when the tenns of

Several tentative answers suggest themselves.

rents in

fact

depend

on

particular the downward pressure
many

the development of core
trade

and why was a reversal in the property rights development s not.

observed;
land

in real land rents followed the

cases

by

productivit y

of

transportat ion
rents that

technical
land.
costs

occurred

more
on

land

changes

Similarly
helped

when

than the terms of

First,
trade and

in

rents was in part blunted in

which
irrigation

served

to

increase

trade declined.

institution al change is not instantaneo us.

the

development and falling

to offset the downward pressure

the terms of

real

on

land

Furthermore~

It is subject to lags.

Thus

the periods of declining real land rents may not have been of •ufficient
duration

to

rangements.

have

induced

major

changes

in

the

institution al

ar

One should, however, still observe declines in the marginal
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rate of

utilization

addition,

of the "sticky"

institutional

arrangements.

In

each new institutional arrangement becomes part of the status

quo with vested interests now often committed to its maintenance.
the incentives

for parties

innovations need

who

Thus

seek to reverse

earlier institutional

As a result,

one might not expect a

to be powerful.

dismantling of the system of property rights in land

during the periods

of declining terms of trade and real land rents but instead to observe a
period of quiescence.
In sun

more work is

test the induced
and

twentieth

history as

model of

needed in

order

institutional

change against the nineteenth

century Asian experience.

a laboratory

.research tool,

to fully elaborate and

While

for the testing

of

the use

theory

of

economic

can be a powerful

especially in the mainly non-experimental disciplines of

the social sciences,

it is also important to briefly apply the analysis

to the contemporary world.
Many

of

occurring today.
modern

the historical

to the evolution

recruitment and supervision of
Philippines.
traditional
varieties.

varieties
of

harvest

of

labor

labor institutions

rice are

powerful

market institutions

harvesting

Hayami and Kikuchi (1981)

labor in

Indonesia

forces
for

the

and the

describe the disequilibrilml in
created by the higher yielding

With the introduction of those varieties traditional harvest

shares for harvest
local

still

Technical change in the forms of mechanization and of

fertilizer-responsive

contributing

transformations described are

economy.

workers substantially
Mechanization

of

exceeded

harvest

extra-village harvest wage labor teams,

real wages

operations,

in

the

the hiring of

or the.innovation of new share-
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arrangements

harvest

the

to

responses

primary

three

the

are

with the choice depending in large part upon the degree

disequilibrium,

cohesion.

of village social

the division of the gains

In the process

from the introduction of the new varieties is being assigned.
Increasing population density and the spread of transportation
infrastructure

communication

and

are

creating

disputes

land

over

For instance

ownership in many areas in the less developed world today.

in northern Thailand the spread of cultivation by ethnic Thai lowlanders
up the slopes of the mountains

is coming into conflict with the swidden

cultivation practices of ethnic minority hill tribesmen.

The situation

of

the forests in

is

further complicated by

Thailand.

16

the open

nature

access

While in theory forest lands belong to the state with

provision for traditional

use of

some

forest products for home consumption,

the state's property rights in increasingly scarce forest land. cannot be
adequately

enforced.
not

is

cultivation

supposed

farmers have few incentives
security.

forest

Because

land

which

to be converted into

to invest

in

land

is

brought

private

property.,

development and little

When titles or other land registration documents are issued,
access to Thai bureaucracy generally means that ethnic Thai

the unequal

are favored in the distribution of property rights in land.
insecurity in
observers,

land

that

rights

has

meant,

The general

according to recent World Bank

farmers have continued to use environmentally damaging

extensive means of cultivation when all parties recognize that it

be in

under

the long run interests of the farmers themselves,

people downstream who suffer from
more intensive modes

would

•• well as the

increased flooding and siltation,

of cultivation were used.

if

Property rights issues
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lie

at

the heart of

disputes in
rangements
land,

the Third

many open access and/or
World today.

to ameliorate these

common property resource

Innovations

in institutional ar-

market failure problems in

the use

of

water, forest, and fisheries resources should therefore be a high

priority

on

demand model
approach.

the political economy
of

induced

research

institutional

agenda.

The supply

change outlined above

is

and
one
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NOTES

1

Seminal demand-induced models of institutional change include
Davis and North (1971),

Hayami and Ruttan (1971),

and North and Thomas

(197 3).

1978a,

institutional change include Ruttan (1977,
1980,

of

or implicitly include the supply

explicitly

that

2works

1978c, 1979,

1978b,

and 1981), Feeny (1976, 1978, 1982), Guttman (1978, 1980), Hayami

and Kikuchi (1978, 1981), Kikuchi and Hayami (1978, 1980), North (1981),
and Roumasset (1978).
3
4

see North (1981).
rhe

general equilibrit.ll'!l model is developed in Hueckel (197 2)

and applied to the Thai case in Feeny (1976, 1982).
5

(1968);

case

For the Burmese

Adas

see

(1974)

and

Cheng Siok-Hua

for the Thai case see Ingram (1971) and Feeny (1982).
6

rhe

by

curately approximated
there was no sharp

in

that the trend

assumption

the trend

in

real land

Trends in

the Sirio-Thai trade

Thailand's international
in

the first half

described in Sarasin (1977);

of

For the Thai

see Feeny (1982).

trade and in

the nineteenth

see also Ingram (1971).

Thai property rights are described in Feeny (1982).

ac-

prices assumes that

decline in the real rate of interest.

case it appears to be a very reasonable assumption;
7

rents is

real land

particular
century are

Developments in

43
8

(1969),

(Ingram (1971,

Hooker (1975),

p.

266);

see

Gisselq uist (1976),

also Feeny (1982),

Johnson

Engel (1978), Kemp (1981),

Yano (1968), and Chalerm rath (1972).
9
Engel (1978).
lORea ...~ wages

the 1864

in rice declined

through 1912 period;

for more

by
on

1.04 percent per yea~ ove~
the trends in

Thai hur.1an

property rights, see Feeny (1982).
11

The discussi on for Burma is based on Furniva l (1909), Baden-

Powell (1892), Trager and Koenig (1979), Adas (1974), and Andrus (1936).
The focus here is on lower Burma.

12

The discussi on for India is based

on Metcalf (1964,

1979),

Stokes (1959), Cohn (1959, 1961), Kessing er (1974), Haden-P owell (1892),
Rothennu nd (1978), and McAlpin (1984).

13
14

see McAlpin (1984).
The discussi on for the Philippi nes is based on Phelan (1959)

and Larkin (1972).

15

For the Cochin China case see

case see Feeny (1982)

Popkin (1979);

for the Thai

and Thai Nationa l Archive s, Sixth Reign, Ministry

of Agricul ture Docur.ien ts 5/1 - 5/12.

16

For more

on

land

disputes and forest resource problems in

northern Thailand see Kunstad ter, Chapman, and Sabhasr i (1978) and Feeny

(1983).
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